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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the effects of rent seeking activities on economic growth in 53
middle-income countries. Our data span the period 2011 to 2020. We use the generalized
method of moments estimator to examine the effects of rent-seeking activities on
economic growth. Our study also includes several control variables, namely democratic
accountability, public debt, human capital, foreign direct investment, capital stock,
population, research and development expenditure and trade openness. The empirical
results suggest that rent-seeking activities impede economic growth in middle-income
countries.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper examines how rent seeking activities affect economic growth in MiddleIncome Countries (MICs). Undoubtedly, governments all around the world tend
to promote (sustainable) economic growth (Gavin and Perotti, 1997). However,
questions or concerns arise that why the desired outcome has yet to be achieved,
given the strong macroeconomic indicators. Why are many MICs stuck in the
middle-income trap for years despite the strong macroeconomic performance? The
World Bank defines middle-income trap as a situation in which middle-income
countries are stuck with slow growth for a long period after reaching a middleincome level. They face difficulties moving towards a high-income status due to
low effectiveness and efficiency when competing with low-wage competitors in
poor countries on one hand, and due to the lack of innovative capabilities relative
to high-income economies on the other. The middle-income trap has become a
conspicuous issue for most MICs as only a limited number of examples (countries)
have been successful in attaining a high-income status. As suggested by Rodrik
(2008), in order to avert the middle-income trap and to have sustainable economic
growth for climbing up to a higher ladder, high institutional quality is the key to
assist MICs to achieve this goal.
In addition, the term “rent seeking” describes the use of public office for
personal benefit (World Bank, 1997). Rent seekers tend to lobby the government
to seek for favorable position, self-interest, and significant rents but have no
intention to create new wealth (Brumm, 1999; Cole and Chawdhry, 2002; Iqbal
and Daly, 2014). Therefore, rent-seeking also can be considered as an expenditure
towards lobbying/bribery by interested groups to get preferential treatment from
the government through public policy such as regulation, taxation, or subsidy
(Krueger, 1974). This is because rent-seeking distorts productive activities of the
economy by imposing social costs, misallocation of public resources (Soto, 2003)
- funds are being channeled to the unproductive sector or in an extreme case,
resources from productive sectors might be channeled to the unproductive ones,
given poor institutional quality.
The presence of rent-seeking activities in a market indicates a lack of
institutional quality which twists the true costs and economic incentives (Ugur
and Dasgupta, 2011). Rent seeking activities build a cost and incentive structure
that is distorted, shaping the expectations and decisions of all economic actors,
and it affects economic growth both directly and indirectly by increasing the costs
of production and generating social inefficiencies (Barro, 1991; Mauro, 1995; Tanzi
and Davoodi, 1998, Svensson, 2005; Ugur, 2014). For example, one of the main
factors causing the failure of governments is accusations of bribery especially
towards eminent politicians such as presidents or prime ministers (Tanzi, 1998).
Furthermore, the existence and exemplification of social costs as the resources
used for rent-seeking has a positive opportunity cost at somewhere in the
economy which is appealing to positive-sum activities. Tullock (1967) explained
that wasting valuable resources by destroying value and being unproductive is
the characteristics of rent-seeking. These features might lead to high public debt
and hampered innovation (Murphy et al., 1993) which in turn, impede economic
growth despite desirable macroeconomic performance. In all, rent seeking, ‘the
form of social costs captured by the expenditure transfer’ (Tullock, 1967), causes
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enormous waste of social resources and thus prevents economic growth (Krueger,
1974).
Given its potential impact on economic development, rent seeking activity has
been an alarming issue for nations regardless of their region or income group as it
affects the decisions of a government regarding the allocation of national resources,
policy-making, and other areas through the influence of special interest groups.
While the major concern of the World Bank and the others alike is the impact of
corruption (rent seeking) on economic growth. The pioneering works of Tullock
(1967), Krueger (1974) and Posner (1975) on the analysis of rent seeking behaviour,
together with later extensions by numerous other researchers, has recently caused
many economists and researchers to pay attention to this issue both theoretically
and empirically.
Based on the traditional rent seeking theory, there are various forms of
preferential seeking/treatment (among which are competitive lobbying and
corruption) by public policy makers which induce private parties to try to gain
from the resulting economic rents and even compete against each other by paying
bribes. Rent seeking is equivalent to corruption when competition for preferential
treatment is constrained to only a few insiders, along with the valuable rent seeking
expenses for the recipient. According to Posner (1975), lobbying for a fixed prize
- corruption is one form of rent-seeking activities. For a bidder to obtain a license
outside of the action process, it will incur the transformation from real resources
expansion to unproductive activities through bribe payment. As a matter of fact,
in the early 1990s, rent-seeking was expressed as ‘corruption’; or as the concept of
‘directly unproductive activities’ and ‘soft budget constraints’, the terms were used
as synonyms, subsets, or related but different aspects of rent-seeking. Therefore,
it is not extensive to conclude that corruption is a type of rent seeking activity.
According to Lambsdorff (2002), corruption is a more monopolistic type of rent
seeking activity, and to some extent, they can be used interchangeably.
There has been substantial amount of research being conducted to study the
economic impacts of corruption on economic growth (see: Tanzi, 1998; RoseArkerman, 1999; Del Monte and Papagni, 2001; Ishola Mobolaji and Omoteso,
2009; Tsaturyan and Bryson, 2009; Maiyaki, 2010; Dridi, 2013; Grabova, 2014). Most
of these studies followed the estimation approaches developed by Barro (1991)
and Levine and Renelt (1992) where average economic growth is considered as a
function of average corruption and certain controlled variables in a cross-sectional
framework. The empirical literature (Blomqvist and Mohammad, 1986; Mauro,
1995; Ugur and Dasgupta, 2011; D’Agostino et al., 2016) showed that corruption
tends to impede growth. Tanzi and Davoodi (1998) documents that corruption
can reduce economic growth through two channels. Firstly, corruption slumps the
competence of infrastructure. Secondly, corruption decreases government revenue
and hence, spending on health care and education. Besides, Gupta (1998) found
that rent seeking increases the gains of rich people at the cost of poor segments due
to inappropriate allocation of resources.
According to Tanzi (1998) and Rose-Arkerman (1999), corruption has a
negative effect on economic performance by not only reducing private investment
and affecting government expenditure on health and education but also by leading
to imbalanced spending and the inefficient allocation of national resources. Del
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Monte and Papagni (2001) documented a similar finding and state that economic
growth was affected by corruption both through the direct effect on average labour
income and through an indirect effect via a decrease in private investment, which
in turn successively reduced the efficiency of public investment spending.
Corruption also tends to hinder investments because it is a tax on investment.
According to Business Monitor International, a London-based risk consultancy,
high levels of corruption have seriously deterred investment in Indonesia’s
infrastructure especially from non-public sources (Quah, 2014). If corruption
do not reduce the level of investment, it will still lower the efficiency of the said
investments. For instance, the studies on least-developed countries by Blomqvist
and Mohammad (1986) as well as Ugur and Dasgupta (2011) supported each other
by reporting that corruption reduced efficiency and that the impact was especially
large through the channel of human capital. The resulting inefficiency, especially
in resource allocation, was due to the bias of public officers or politicians towards
transactions that offered greater opportunities for bribery (rent seeking activities).
This, in turn, resulted in a wastage of resources in projects that were not competitive
enough (Quah, 2014).
Rent seeking activities also may affect long-term economic growth and
development through its negative impact on productivity. This is because rent
seeking increases the cost of doing business. World Bank analysis suggested that
corruption could increase the cost of projects in Indonesia by up to 20 percent
(Quah, 2014). D’Agostino et al. (2016) interacted corruption with government
spending (military spending and investment spending) in examining the impact
on growth for 106 mixed countries. Their results revealed that the interaction had
substantial adverse impacts on growth, implying that government policies or
expenditure may not help in promoting growth if the resources/funds were not
being channeled into productive and competitive sectors. The costs of rent seeking
are enormous under most political regimes to the extent that they exceed total
income in many economies, including the United States (Dougan, 1991).
On the other hand, there are some studies (see Glaeser and Saks, 2006; Park,
2012; Forooq et al., 2013) which investigates the rent-seeking’s impact on economic
growth through the channel of financial sector. Note that rent seeking tends to
take place when there are numerous rules and regulations which encourage the
rent seeker to pay bribes in order to evade these regulations. Undeniably, banking
sector is more regulated than the other sectors, therefore, banking industry is
more susceptible for rent seeking activities. For example, loan can be approved by
bypassing loan reviewer process, to gain regulatory forbearance. Forooq et al. (2013)
reveal that there is a negative and statistically significant effect of corruption on
economic growth. Rent seeking activity significantly worsened the quality of bank
loans by bypassing loan reviewer process, hence, it is difficult to detect the nonperforming loan. The resulting increase in bad loans will lead to reduced growth
of a nation’s economy. This shows that the allocation of bank funds transferred
from a profitable project to non-performing project could decrease the quality of
private investment.
The above-mentioned studies thus far provide empirical evidence that
corruption has an adverse effect on economic growth through inefficient private/
public investment and the misallocation of public resourcesand. Other than harms,
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss2/5
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rent seeking, in contrast, also helps in stimulating economic growth. Sometimes,
bribes act as a lubricant to smoothen the process of trade or facilitate production
that would not happen otherwise or may assist as sign for growth opportunities.
Rent seeking practice may stimulate efficiency by helping private agents to evade
restrictive regulation (Leff, 1964; Moen and Weill, 2010; Huang, 2016). Lui (1996)
had a consistent finding based on the queue model where firms are willing to
pay bribes to the official to obtain business license, and hence, to avoid the delay
of investment. The positive and significant relationship between rent seeking/
corruption and economic growth was also found in a recent study (Huang, 2016).
This is consistent with Wedeman (1997) findings in which the author document
that the higher economic development in South Korea brought by rent seeking
activity (with acceptable rate of rent seeking activities) can help in increasing the
efficiency of the government officials.
Taken together, in line with the pioneering work of Leff (1964) w the vast
literature documented inconclusive findings with respect to the relationship
between rent seeking activities and economic growth. Based on this drawback of
this literature, this study hypothesizes that rent-seeking promotes and hinders
economic growth. The hypothesis is motivated and supported by both the
extensive documentation of negative relationship (and the ‘putting sand on wheel
hypothesis’) as well as the ‘greasing the wheel’ hypothesis of Méon and Weill (2010)
and the ‘queue model’ by Lui (1996). By adopting the System Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) estimators which are suitable in capturing the dynamic nature
of the involved data and endogeneity problem, this study empirically exmines the
effects of rent seeking activities on economic growth for a panel of 53 MICs during
the period 2011-2020. In line with the prior literature, our findings reveal that rentseeking activities retard economic growth.
We have plotted corruption perception index in Figure 1 which is used to
measure rent seeking activities - the horizontal axis indicates the Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) for which an increase in CPI index means a stronger
control of corruption in a country and vice-versa. On the other hand, the vertical
axis represents the GDP per capita. While the buttons distributed on the topright corner are referring to developed countries where they have better control
of corruption and they enjoy high economic growth, the buttons distributed in
the lower-left corner refer to the countries that have relatively less control over
corruption and achieved relatively low economic growth - most of them are
middle- and low-income countries. In all, rent-seeking is deemed to be having
a negative relationship with economic growth as a higher corruption perception
index (lower rent-seeking activities) is associated with higher economic growth.
This relationship would be especially applicable in the MICs and this does not seem
very surprising as MICs, unlike the high-income counterpart, are less endowed,
both in terms of funds and expertise, making them less able to navigate through
a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy effectively (Narayan and Bui, 2021), thereby
retarding economic growth. Taken together, MICs (for example, Vietnam, India,
Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Nepal) are more disadvantaged by a corrupt system.
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Figure 1.
Rent-Seeking Activities and Economic Growth
This figure plots the relationship between rent seeking activities and economic growth. Source: International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG), World Development Indicator (WDI).
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For these countries to move upward to achieve high-income status, sustain
rapid growth serves as a key determinant and challenge. This is because, while
Low-Income Countries (LICs) with rapid economic growth can easily graduate
and become MICs, the latter group of countries will find themselves difficult to
promote from middle-income status to the status of high-income, despite that
their economic growth rate were found to be surpassing those of High-Income
Countries (HICs). This issue refers to middle-income trap in which one of the key
factors is the challenge of poor institutional quality featuring the MICs, compared
to HICs. Increased rent-seeking activity is a sign of serious institutional fragility. It
is also a blame for reducing investment and inappropriate expenditure, widening
income inequality, then reducing foreign direct investment, distorting the market,
and issue of reallocation of resources - all these changes will cause a potential loss
in government’s revenues in the developing countries
The contribution of this study to the literature are multiple folds. First, mixed
results found in the existing literatures in regard to the relationship between rentseeking activities and economic growth - the ‘sand’ and ‘grease’ wheels hypotheses,
has created the inspiration to this study in clarifying the rent-seeking’s impact
on economic growth. The challenge of MICs, namely the middle-income trap
has widely been studied in the framework of economic growth model1 in which
it indicated that convergence of economic growth in MICs depends on human
capitals, investments, FDIs, and capital accumulations that predominantly focused
1

See Cai (2012) indicated that the “middle‐income trap” is in line with the framework of the
mainstream economic growth theories, therefore it is a useful concept which we can analyse the
economic growth phenomena in the specific economic growth phases
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on these traditional and material manifestation aspects of economic growth.
However, as far as this study is concerned, limited studies have focused on how
rent-seeking activities affect economic performance from the middle-income trap
perspective.
Furthermore, the existing empirical studies have generally covered different
countries or only focused on a single country (see: Dougan, 1991; Kimenyi and
Mbaku, 1993; Mauro, 1995; Lambsdorff, 2002; Lash, 2004; Ugur and Dasgupta,
2011; Hill, 2012; Kis-Katos and Schulze, 2013; D’Agostino et al., 2016;). For instance,
Saha and Ali (2017) generally investigated LICs, MICs as well as HICs. However,
relatively limited research (as far as we are concerned) has been carried out
specifically on MICs (Blomqvist and Mohammad, 1986). In fact, the linkage from
the perspective of MICs is especially unneglectable (Owusu‐Nantwi and Erickson,
2016; Lopez and Nahon, 2017). The focus on MICs is due to the fact that they are
classically under a process of development but still in the transition phase; rentseeking activities are described as heterogeneous (Iqbal and Daly, 2014), owing to
the lack of institutional quality in these countries. When the institutional quality
is underdeveloped, rent-seekers will have the ‘opportunity’ to develop their own
unique interest, resources will be redirected, and money will be redistributed by
breaking restrictions. According to Spinesi (2009), the presence of rent-seeking
activity is more common in MICs when compared to HICs. Although efforts
to control rent seeking have been made, the problem of rent seeking still exists
in these countries and it might be a significant obstacle to the development of
these countries and may prevent them from moving forward to the high-income
category.
Finally, this study provides alternative measurements to close the research
gap of CPI on pre-2012 observation2. Notably, these observations were published
before 2012 by Transparency International and it consists of data for different
components and time periods to measure the rent-seeking activities across the
continents. Therefore, to provide a robust empirical evidence , this study adopts
two different proxies from two sources to measure the rent-seeking activities
namely the World Governance Indicator (WGI) and Transparency International
(TI), over the period 2011 - 2020. The main objective of this paper is to provide an
explanation to policymakers in MICs as to why middle-income trap exists for such
a long time, economic growth is hard to be stimulated and sustained, despite the
EXTENSIVE initiatives have been rolled-out by the government to attract more
FDI, and capital accumulation.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the theoretical
framework while Section III explains the methodology. Section IV discusses the
main empirical results and finally Section V concludes the study.
2

Grundler and Potrafke (2019) argued that the CPI for pre-2012 was not comparable over time.
Transparency International emphasised: “Following a rigorous review process, some important changes
have been made to the methodology in 2012. The method we use to aggregate different data sources has been
simplified and also now includes just one year’s data from each data source. Crucially, this method will allow
us to compare scores over time, which was not methodologically possible previously. Given the changes to the
methodology, it must be emphasized that country scores of the CPI 2012 cannot be compared against those
of 2011 or previous editions. Year to year comparisons will be possible from 2012 onwards” (Transparency
International, 2012, p.1)
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
This study’s theoretical framework is originated from the model of Barro (1991)
and Mauro (1995). Generally, the growth mechanism in production function is
expressed as follow:
(1)
where total output level is denoted by Y, total factor production is denoted by T,
the notations K and L stand for capital and labour, respectively.
The total differentiation of Y is given as follows:
(2)
Dividing Equation (1) by Y yields into a decomposition similar to Solow (1956)
which takes the following form:
(3)
Equation (3) shows the Schumpeterian growth theory of economic development
by Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt (2015) which differentiates two different effects
on the progress of an economy. The first effect indicates the changes in factor
availability in the growth component which is related to the growth rate in capital
and labour. The second effect focuses on the impact of social and technological
changes in the development component which is related to the forces influencing
the production function’s total productivity growth (Schumpeter, 1961). The main
components of growth model are characterized as follows:
(4)
where GR refers to the growth rate of the real GDP, γ is the total factor productivity,
the investment output ratio is denoted by IY while dLL is the growth rate of labour.
Fγ is equal to 1, The marginal production of capital is FIY, and FdLL which represents
the elasticity of the output of labour. Besides, the main components that been
highlighted by Levine and Renelt (1992) in examining growth rate are referring to
share of investment in the GDP, population, the real GDP per capita and human
capital. Apart from these, other five control variables are included in this study
namely democratic accountability, public debt, foreign direct investment, research
and development (RandD) expenditure, and trade openness. While the traditional
growth theories focus on the material manifestation components of economic
growth like labour, human capital, capital and technology, institutional factors
are also important in explaining the growth as they are directly influencing the
incentive framework of an economy. Thus, the economic growth equation can be
re-written as follows:
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss2/5
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(5)
Rent-seeking is the main variable for this study which is proxied by the
Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The theoretical ground of incorporating
rent-seeking into the growth analysis lies mainly on the rent-seeking hypothesis,
‘sanding and greasing wheel’ hypothesis. On one hand, corruption serves as an
impediment to economic growth through the distortion to incentive framework,
generation and exemplification of social costs, and misallocation of resources. The
paper of Narayan and Bui (2021) completely reflects how the poor institutional
quality, characterized by corruption and bribery harm the import and export
and hence the international trade. In turn, the lack of simplicity, transparency,
consistency of regulations and policies relating to trade in Vietnam support
traditionally endemic corruption behavior. On the other hand, corruption also
serves as a driver of growth through the ease of business as a result of lower
bureaucracy and red-taped due to payment (Meon and Sekkat, 2005). Also, through
the streamlined process of applying for copyrights and patents by the potential
innovators, corruption promotes innovation activities and hence promotes
sustainable economic growth. In this study, rent-seeking is used to illustrate the
‘sand’ and ‘grease’ wheels hypotheses in order to clarify the rent-seeking’s impact
on economic growth in the case of MICs.
To ensure that the estimated coefficient captures the rent-seeking’s impact, it
is important to exert control on the other growth determinants. In general, much
research has been carried out on the determinants of economic growth. However,
there have been less study focused on rent-seeking and economic growth in
MICs. According to Murphy et al., (1993), one of the important determinants
of rent-seeking is the share of government expenditure. Talented people will
be discouraged from becoming entrepreneurs when there is a large share of
government expenditure financed by a higher tax rate in the taxes system, hence,
reducing investment spending and leading to lower economic growth. Therefore,
rent-seeking in countries with higher government spending tends to lead to a
lower growth rate.
III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
A. Methodology
A structural and empirical approach is employed in this study using panel data.
In particular, due to the panel nature of the data and the presence of a lagged
dependent variable, the GMM estimator was used to analyse the effects of rentseeking activities on the economic growth in MICs. The technique was introduced
by Arellano-Bond (1991) as well as by Arellano and Bover (1995). System GMM
was the preferred estimator because it allows the model to eliminate any countryspecific time-invariant effects. Standard polled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and
random effects models were less appropriate for this study due to the presence of a
lagged dependent variable, correlating with the error term, and which thus would
lead to an upward bias and inconsistency when using the OLS method. On the
other hand, with respect to the fixed effects estimator, during the transformation,
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the country-specific effect error term will be removed. However,
is
the correction between the transformed error term and the transformed lagged
dependent variable is a function of 1/T, indicating that the correlation will only be
negligible when T is large. Otherwise, the standard fixed effects estimator will be
biased downward.
Considering the dynamic log-linear equation for economic growth (which
includes a lagged dependent variable), our empirical model can be specified as
follows:

(6)
where lnRGDP represents economic growth, lnRS refers to rent-seeking
activities which are proxied using the corruption index, lnDemo is the democracy
accountability, lnPD represents public debt, lnHC denotes human capital, lnFDI
represents foreign direct investment, lnCP represents capital stock, lnPOP
represents population, and lnRD and lnTO are represented by RandD expenditure
and trade openness, respectively. All variables are expressed in natural logarithmic
form.
The instruments are derived from the number of lag dependent variable,
number of explanatory variables, constant term, and time dummies. The greater
the number of explanatory variables and time dummies, the greater the number of
instruments. Besides, the greater the lag for the dependent variable (subject to the
length of time periods), the number of instruments is higher.
Equation (6) presumes that economic growth is affected by rent-seeking
activities and a set of control variables. The control variables include: the history of
economic performance, summarized by the lagged dependent variable; the voice
of concern by government, captured by democratic accountability; the government
debt level, proxied by public debt (percentage of GDP); Human Capital (HC) is
proxied by life expectancy (in total years); net flow of foreign direct investment, is
captured by the percentage of net inflow in GDP; capital stock refer to investment
over GDP; population is proxied by total population for the country; RandD
expenditure refers to the expenditure in percentage of gross domestic product;
and trade openness refers to the sum of exports and import of goods and services
measured as a share of gross domestic product.
The rent-seeking activities hypothesis - higher rent-seeking activities reduce
economic growth - is satisfied if both derivations are negative. An increase in
rent seeking activities would then result in lower economic growth, therefore
β2 is expected to have a negative sign. Besides, β3 - the coefficient of democracy
accountability is to have a negative sign because an increase in democracy might
give an opportunity to corrupt official. The politician had been elected by the
majority in the election will have access to government budget. The politician who
has high personal interest might use this opportunity to influence the government
policy that favors themselves or a group of special interest person, hence it leads
to misallocation of resources. While for the public debt hypothesis - higher public
debts reduces economic growth, and the expected sign for β4 is negative. The
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss2/5
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HC in β5 is expected to have a positive sign since HC is the source of knowledge
accumulation that assist for higher level of innovation to improve technological
status for the nation. In addition, β6 and β7 are expected to have a positive influence
on economic growth as a higher index of FDI and higher capital accumulation
will promote the nation’s economic growth. β8 is expected to have a positive sign
toward economic growth as an increase in population leads to higher investment
in human capital and hence promote economic growth. The RandD expenditure
captured by β9 is expected to have a positive effect on economic growth, as the
expenditure in RandD leads to more technology advancement hence leading
to higher economic growth. Finally, β10 is expected to carry a positive sign. The
increase in total of exports and imports in goods and services will lead to higher
economy output level.
B. Data
This study employed a panel data of 53 MICs covering the period 2011 - 2020.
The MICs were selected based on the World Bank’s criteria. The variables used in
this study include economic growth (proxied by the real GDP per capita, RGDP)
and the Corruption Index (CI) as a proxy for rent-seeking activities (sourced
from World Governance Indicator and Transparency International). Democratic
accountability (Demo) measures how responsive government is to its people where
the data was obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG); and
data for public debt (public debt as a percentage of GDP, PD) was obtained from
the World Development Indicator (WDI). Human capital (HC) is represented by
life expectancy in total years and the net inflow of foreign direct investment is a
measure of foreign direct investment (FDI) - obtained from the WDI. Capital stock
(CP), also known as capital accumulation, refers to real investment in tangible
means production. Besides, population (POP) is in total population for the
country. RandD expenditure (RD) is the total spending in RandD in percentage of
GDP. Trade openness (TO) is the sum of exports and import of goods and services
measured as a share of GDP. The data for the Corruption Index is published by
the Transparency International (TI) has been widely used in related research as
a measure of rent-seeking/corruption (Ullah and Ahmad, 2016; Saha and Ali,
2017), where a higher score indicates better control of corruption and vice versa.
Democratic accountability, public debt, HC, foreign direct investment, capital
stock, population, RandD expenditure, and trade openness represent control
variables in this study.
We report descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study in Table 1. The
maximum value for RGDP is 559.0 while the minimum value is 2.06. On average,
the RGDP for MICs is 4431.55 and the standard deviation is 1488.06. The highest
value of FDI is equal to 55.07 whereas the minimum valueis -37.15 which indicates
the percentage decrease in net inflow of FDI. Mean and standard deviation for FDI
is 3.07 and 4.34, respectively.
Additionally, Table 2 depicts the pairwise correlation between rent-seeking
activities and economic growth. Notably, it shows that RD (0.47) have the strongest
correlation with economic growth followed by HC (0.21), POP (0.16), CP (0.13),
and democratic accountability (0.05). Moreover, rent-seeking activities WGI (-0.16
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), TI (-0.18) and PD (-0.009), FDI (-0.18), and TO (-0.49) are negatively correlated
with the dependent variable-economic growth.
Table 1.
Summary Statistics
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics of data used in this study. RGDP is real economic growth, RS (WGI)
is rent-seeking activities from World Governance Indicator, RS (TI) is rent-seeking activities from Transparency
International, Demo is democratic accountability, PD is public debt, HC is human capital, FDI represents foreign direct
investment, CP is capital stock, POP denotes population, RD represents research and development expenditure, and
TO denotes trade openness.

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

RGDP
RS(WGI)
RS(TI)
DEMO
PD
HC
FDI
CP
POP
RD
TO

2310
1407
716
1407
569
2392
2216
2747
2747
707
2307

4431.55
39.09
3.66
3.64
53.24
65.74
3.08
41.14
7.77
0.42
73.28

1488.07
19.61
0.95
1.28
34.25
7.68
4.34
22.72
5.31
0.36
36.26

2.06E+07
0.47
1.40
0.72
3.67
43.17
-37.15
11.50
1.16
0.0054
0.17

559.04
9.23
6.80
6.00
277.5
79.61
55.07
59.60
15.60
2.19
274.97

Table 2.
Correlation
Notes: This table reports pairwise correlation coefficient between variables considered in this study. All variables
are defined in Table 1 The “ln” before a variable notation denotes that variable is taken in its natural logarithm form.

lnRGDP
lnRGDP
lnRS
(WGI)
lnRS
(TI)
lnDEMO
lnPD
lnHC
lnFDI
lnCP
lnPOP
lnRD
lnTO

lnRS LnRS
lnDEMO lnPD lnHC lnFDI lnCP lnPOP lnRD lnTO
(WGI) (TI)

1.00
-0.16

1.00

-

-0.18

-

1.00

0.05
-0.009
0.21
-0.18
0.13
0.16
0.47
-0.49

0.16
0.14
-0.40
-0.17
-0.37
-0.47
-0.08
-0.05

0.39
0.28
0.19
-0.01
0.19
0.18
0.32
0.17

1.00
0.29
-0.13
-0.16
-0.12
-0.14
0.03
-0.19

1.00
-0.13
-0.18
-0.01
-0.04
0.22
-0.17

1.00
0.17
0.72
0.72
0.04
-0.07

1.00
0.16
0.18
-0.02
0.15

1.00
0.97
0.10
0.11

1.00
0.11
0.11

1.00
0.007

1.00

IV. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Table 3 reports results obtained from estimating Equation (6) using a GMM model.
Models 1 and 2 represent the GMM two-step system and the GMM two-step system
robust, respectively, while Models 3 and 4 are meant for the robustness check. The
https://bulletin.bmeb-bi.org/bmeb/vol25/iss2/5
DOI: 10.21098/bemp.v25i2

12

Wong et al.: THE EFFECTS OF RENT SEEKING ACTIVITIES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN MIDD
The Asymmetric Effects of Exchange Rate Volatility on International Trade in a Transition
Economy: The Case of Vietnam

227

second order autocorrelation [AR(2)] coefficients indicate that there is no evidence
of statistically significant second order autocorrelation. Finally, the coefficient of
the lagged dependent variable was found to be statistically significant at the one
percent significance level which indicates that the model is dynamic in nature.
Both, Sargan and Hansen test for Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 failed to reject the null
hypothesis, which indicates that the overidentifying restriction are valid.
Besides, Table 3 presents the results and robustness check for the analysis of
how rent-seeking activities affect economic growth in MICs. This study investigates
the rent-seeking’s impact on economic growth using different measures of
rentseeking in an extension of the proxy variables from the World Governance
Indicator (WGI). Moreover, system GMM estimator will be used for robustness
checks while control variables are the same. In Table 3, Model 1 and Model 2
show the results for System GMM Two-step and Two-step Robust respectively for
rentseeking’s proxy obtained from WGI; while Model 3 and Model 4 are the results
of robustness check for System GMM Two-step and Two-step Robust respectively
for rent-seeking’s proxy under Transparency International (TI). The individual
results obtained using the 2 different proxies of rent-seeking, reinforce each other
in which rent-seeking negatively affects economic growth in MICs.
The negative sign of rent-seeking coefficient in Model 1, as expected, suggest
the existence of a negative relationship between rent-seeking activities and
economic growth. Additionally, it can be concluded that rent-seeking has a
long-term negative impact on economic growth. More specifically, one percent
increase in rent-seeking activities reduces economic growth by 0.172 percent. Our
robustness check results based on Model 3 where we use the corruption perception
index (obtained from different source, namely the Transparency International) are
also consistent with our prior findings. Overall, our findings are also consistent
with prior literature, see for instance, Paul (2010), Adenike (2013), Dridi (2013),
and Farooq et al. (2013).
Based on the existing literature, corruption reduces economic growth via
decreasing the competence of infrastructure and public investment (see Tanzi and
Davoodi, 1998). Thus, this will generate lower productivity in the country.
The sand-in-the-wheels hypothesis in the MICs context is further evidenced
in the study of Narayan and Bui (2021) who documented a negative relationship
between corruption and economic growth. The authors also found that perception
of corruption in Vietnam itself and its middle-income trading partners is more
important and robust in impacting long-term trade flows, compared to the
one of its high-income trading partners. The rationale behind this is that MICs,
unlike HICs, are possessing relatively low endowment, both in terms of funds
and expertise, making them less capable to overcome a corrupt and inefficient
bureaucracy effectively and to seek quick turnarounds of their import contracts. In
short, due to the feature of more disadvantaged by a corrupt system, MICs would
have larger adverse effect of corruption on economic growth.
While a negative relationship between rent-seeking and economic growth is
found in the case of MICs, it is also applicable in the context of LICs (Wong, Chen
and Yiew, 2021; Saha and Ali, 2017) in which a high level of corruption creates a
big problem. However, if these countries (including some of the middle eastern
and North African (MENA) countries), characterized by diverse ethnic groups as
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2022

13

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Vol. 25, No. 2 [2022], Art. 5
228

Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, Volume 25, Number 2, 2022

well as instable politics, is given a chance to have higher political freedom and
minimum ethnic tension, corruption could be reduced, hence promoting economic
development (Saha and Ali, 2017).
On the other hand, the results based on Model 1 indicates a positive relationship
between PD and economic growth We further note that one percent increase in
PD resulted in a 0.012 percent increase in economic growth. However, the results
obtained from Model 3 are found to be statistically insignificant. These results
support the findings of Saifuddin (2016) who examined the relationship between
PD and economic growth by using the investment model and growth model
and documented that PD is positively related to both investment and economic
growth. Hence, PD has an indirect positive effect on economic growth through the
positive influence on investment instead of crowding out the effect of investment.
Education is widely known as the main ingredient of human capital, which in
turn, is the source of economic growth. The results obtained from Model 1 shows
a positive and statistically significant impact of HC on economic growth in MICs.
Our robustness check results (based on Model 3) are consistent with our main
findings. Additionally, we have also noted that a one percent increase in HC will
lead to a 1.78 percent increase in economic growth. Based on the endogeneous
growth theory, HC is the key component of economic development that leads to
higher growth rate (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990). Majority of the studies reviewed
support that HC positively influent economic growth, employability of the
person, behavior of society to facilitate a gracious social, as well as the political
and economic environment that encourage domestic and foreign investment to the
nation. Hence, higher educated workforce provides more monetary rewards and
stable employment foreground, which in turn improve the living standard of the
citizens (Fernandez and Mauro, 2000; Gylfason and Zoega, 2003; Abbas and Peck,
2008; Hassan and Ahmed, 2011).
In addition, the results for FDI showed a positive effect on economic growth.
Additionally, a one percent increase in FDI leads to an increase of 0.036 percent
in economic growth (see Model 3) . However, the FDI is found to be statistically
insignificant in the case of Model 1. Our findings are consistent with prior literature
(see for example, Baharumshah and Thanoon, 2006; Upadhyaya et al., 2007;
Lechman and Kaur, 2015). According to the prior literature, FDI may stimulate
economic growth through the channel of technological diffusion, creating job
opportunity, and increasing capital (Borensztein et al., 1998; De Gregorio, 2003; De
Mello, 1997). Thus, this study supports the FDI-led growth hypothesis.
Additionally, we found that CP has a positive and statistically significant effect
on economic growth. We have also noted that one percent rise in CP will lead to
a 1.04 percent increase in economic growth (see Model 1). The robustness check
based on Model 3 also provides similar findings. This outcome backs up Solow’s
(1957) theory which states that capital accumulation has a considerable impact on
the level of productivity. In accordance with the present results, previous studies
have interpreted that to have a higher economic growth pattern, government plays
a vital role in enhancing capital (Chen, 2006). Besides, the study from Ahlerup,
Olsson and Yanagizawa (2009) which analyzed the effects of capital stock in
Canada and Nigeria demonstrate that in a weakly institutionalized economy like
Nigeria, a rise in capital stock has significantly increase the growth rate in the
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nation and the percentage growth in a Nigeria is greater than the growth rate
obtained in Canada.
Furthermore, we find that POP has a positive effect on economic growth
irrespective of models used. We have also noted that a one percent increase
in POP will increase economic growth by a 3.19 percent. According to Becker,
Glaeser and Murphy (1999), compared to the traditional diminishing marginal
return in intensive use of land and other natural resources, the bigger population
inspires greater specialization and increases investment in human capital. Hence,
the effect of the latter on economic growth is stronger than the effects of the
former (diminishing returns in resources-constrained sectors). These findings are
consistent with earlier studies (see Kuznet, 1967; Kelley and McGreevey, 1994;
Kelley 1998).
Additionally, we also document that TO has a positive and statistically
significant effect on economic growth. We found that a one percent increase in
TO will increase economic growth by 0.023 percent. Once again, our results are
consistent with previous findings. TO plays a vital role in stimulating economic
growth, the superiority of outward-oriented policy and the increases of foreign
reserves owing to increased exports are the effects of TO which led to an expansion
of market and further increase in productivity in the host country’s economy
(Keho, 2017; Çevik et al., 2019; Intisar et al., 2020).
Table 3.
The Impact of Rent-seeking Activities on Economic Growth
Notes: This table reports results obtained from estimating Equation (6). The corruption index has been multiplied
by -1 so that a higher value of the index indicates higher level of rent-seeking. Figures reported in parentheses (.) are
t-statistics. ***, ** and * indicate statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.

System GMM
Two-step
Model 1
lnRGDPit-1
lnRS (WGI)

1.015***
(192.35)
-0.172***
(-4.96)

System GMM
Two-step
Robust
Model 2

System GMM

1.015***
(87.49)
-0.172**
(-1.98)

1.006***
(80.77)

1.006***
(95.03)

-0.082**
(-1.65)
0.029
(0.91)
-0.013
(-0.70)
8.030***
(2.79)
0.036***
(4.52)
6.683***
(2.81)

-0.082**
(-1.65)
0.029
(1.18)
-0.013
(-0.37)
8.030*
(1.84)
0.036**
(2.25)
6.683*
(1.83)

lnRS (TI)
lnDemo
lnPD
lnHC
lnFDI
lnCP

0.0009
(0.28)
0.012***
(4.18)
1.780***
(4.25)
-0.002
(-1.40)
1.036***
(5.15)

0.0009
(0.14)
0.012
(4.18)
1.780**
(1.97)
-0.002
(-0.32)
1.036**
(2.01)
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Table 3.
The Impact of Rent-seeking Activities on Economic Growth (Continued)
System GMM
Two-step
Model 1
lnPOP
lnRD
lnTO
CONS
AR(1)
AR(2)
Sargan
Hansen

3.188***
(7.60)
-0.004
(-0.75)
0.023*
(1.88)
-4.454***
(-2.52)
-1.80*
-0.21
29.17
11.07

System GMM
Two-step
Robust
Model 2

System GMM

3.188***
(3.53)
-0.004
(-0.29)
0.023*
(0.79)
-4.454
(-0.98)
-1.73*
-0.12
29.17
11.07

0.029***
(4.67)
-0.010
(-0.55)
0.005
(0.22)
66.62**
(2.78)
-2.11**
-1.19
20.29
7.63

Two-step
Model 3

System GMM
Two-step
Robust
Model 4
0.029***
(2.90)
-0.010
(-0.31)
0.005
(0.09)
66.62*
(1.83)
-2.18**
1.34
20.29
7.63

V. CONCLUSION
The issue of rent-seeking is prevalent and has attracted international attention,
along with the middle-income trap that has seen most of the middle-income
nations fail to reach high-income status. These issues have attracted the attention
of various policymakers and researchers around the world. One of the most
frequently asked questions is whether rent-seeking behaviours have a detrimental
impact on growth.
The main results reveal that the impact of rent-seeking on economic growth
is statistically significant and negative for all MICs. Overall, our findings
corroborate the traditional notion that rent-seeking is a barrier to economic
progress, particularly for MICs, meaning that efforts to maintain and uphold
institutional quality, particularly in developing nations, are critical in moving
them from MIC to HIC status. In other words, rent-seeking practices should be
properly and efficiently curtailed in MICs. In this case, extensive implementation
of anti-corruption policies can be the means to promote rapid and sustainable
economic growth especially in the MICs. However, it is also important to note that
one of the limitation of our study is the failure to comprehensively distinguish
between rent-seeking and corruption. According to Lambsdorff (2002), corruption
is less harmful since rent-seeking encompasses the wastage of resources in the
competition for preferential treatment i.e. corruption. In other words, corruption
involves a narrower range of interest than competitive lobbying (rent-seeking).
This limitation opens an extended scope (such as comparing the individual effects
of corruption and rent-seeking respectively) of study for future researchers on this
subject matter.
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